Introduction
In parliamentary systems of government, the executive normally rests on the confidence of the legislature for its continuance in office. If the legislature passes a vote of censure, the government goes, either by resigning or calling fresh elections. The United Kingdom is not unusual in this respect. However, in 2011 the capacity to force an election through voting no confidence in the Government almost was lost. In the event, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 modified the consequences of the House of Commons expressing its lack of confidence in the Government. Here, we analyse how this outcome was arrived at. It was the result of the distinctive basis of the convention governing votes of confidence in the UK, the formation of a coalition Government and a 2 November 1990 (HC Deb. 22 Nov. 1990, cols. 439-519) . It could also incorporate a reason for the lack of confidence. Thus, for example, Kinnock on 27 March 1991 moved the motion, 'That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's Government in the light of its inability to rectify the damage done to the British people by the poll tax' (HC Deb. 27 March 1991 , cols. 964-1053 . Most motions of no confidence moved by the Leader of the Opposition fell in this second category. The salient point is that there was explicit reference to a lack of confidence. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was not unusual to have motions, 'That this House deplores…' and in 1985 Neil Kinnock moved a motion 'That this House censures Her Majesty's Government for its gross mismanagement of the British economy…', but subsequent motions referred explicitly to confidence. As the House of Commons Library note on Confidence Motions observed, a 'censure' motion 'can also apply to a broader category of motion which may have some of the characteristics of a confidence motion... but which does not appear from all the circumstances to have the intention of bringing about directly, by its passing, the removal of the Government' (House of Commons Library 2013, p. 5). Expressing explicitly no confidence in the Government removed ambiguity as to the purpose of the motion.
A motion of no confidence would usually be tabled and moved by the Leader of the Opposition,
though it was open to any Member to table such a motion. It was, as Erskine May expressed it, established convention that the Government always acceded to the demand of the Leader of the Opposition to allot a day for discussion of the motion, with a reasonably early day invariably being found. 'This convention is founded on the recognized position of the Opposition as the potential Government, which guarantees the legitimacy of such an interruption of the normal course of business. For its part, the Government has everything to gain by meeting such a direct challenge to its authority at the earliest possible moment' (Jack 2011, p. 344 The Government on these occasions secured a majority. However, the first Labour Government was not so fortunate. In October 1924, the Cabinet decided to treat a Conservative motion of censure on the Campbell case, and a Liberal amendment calling for the appointment of a select committee, as issues of confidence (Cook 1975, p. 276) . The Liberal amendment was carried by 364 votes to 199
and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald was granted dissolution (Nicolson 1952 , pp. 399-400, Cook 1975 .
c. Implicit votes of confidence
The third category comprised what were considered to be implicit votes of confidence, notably votes on the Queen's Speech and the Budget. The measures falling in this category were small in number and, indeed, as the House of Commons Library Note put it, 'speculative' (House of Commons Library
Between publication of the agreement and introduction of the legislation, the Government changesd its mind over the provision for a super-majority, changing the threshhold from 55 per cent to twothirds of all MPs. There was also pressure to maintain provision for an early election in the event of the Government losing a vote of confidence. The reason for its exclusion was logical in terms of wanting dissolution to be possible only in the event of a super-majority, but the reasoning behind the exclusive provision in the agreement was flawed in that, if the junior partner to a coalition left the Government and joined with opposition parties, the combined forces could defeat government on a range of key votes, making it effectively impossible for the Government to govern. The use of a no confidence vote was the cleanest, rather than the only, way of demonstrating that the Government lacked the confidence of the House.
Pressure to include provisions for an early election in the event of the loss of a vote of confidence resulted in a Bill notably different to that envisaged in the coalition agreement. As the Advocate General for Scotland, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, conceded during debates on the Bill in the Lords, 'it will be obvious that the proposals in the Bill are not the ones described in the [Laws] of such a defeat, a motion 'That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's Government' is moved and carried. In short, the three types of confidence votes that could result in an early election under the convention are now confined to the first -an explicitly worded motion. The wording has to be precise. A motion deploring or censuring the Government would not qualify. Thus, it is not just a case of the first category alone, but a very clearly defined part of that category.
The change between the Bill as introduced and the Bill as enacted has notable implications for Government. The primary purpose of the Bill was to remove the Prime Minister's capacity to employ the prerogative to call a general election at a time of his or her choosing (an opportunistic election).
However, the effects of the amendments to the Bill in regards to votes of confidence rob of him also col. 1170). To avoid manipulation of this sort, the Government arranging a defeat on a vote of confidence in order to engineer an election at a time of its choosing, the Act thus deprives the Prime
Minister of an important political tool.
The Prime Minister, in short, has lost the capacity to trigger a general election through attaching confidence to a particular vote. The capacity to resign remains. The Prime Minister could still say that confidence attaches to an important vote and, that if defeated, the Government will resign. If the Government did tender its resignation, the provisions of the Act would not be triggered. We would thus be in novel, but not unprecedented, constitutional territory. There is a 20 th Century precedent for a Government resigning without seeking dissolution. The Conservative Government of Arthur Balfour was falling apart in 1905 and Balfour tendered the Government's resignation. The Liberal leader, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, formed a Government and then sought dissolution (Adams 2007 , p. 227, Russell 1973 The provision for an early general election by a vote of two-thirds of all MPs could be seen as putting power in the hands of the principal parties in the House. As Vernon Bogdanor observed, it would essentially be the party leaders getting together to agree that an election was justified. 'While the Act might conceivably alter the conditions under which political leaders can seek a dissolution, it is hardly likely to give more power to backbench MPs or to strengthen Parliament' (Bogdanor 2011, p. 119) .
The provision for a motion of no confidence was somewhat different in that it essentially transferred power to the hands of recalcitrant backbenchers. It did not transfer power to the House as a whole, as it already held the power to bring down a Government on a vote of confidence. Rather, it strengthened the position of Government backbenchers in opposing substantive measures. The Prime
Minister could no longer make it a vote in which one had to choose between opposing the measure or avoiding a general election. A Prime Minister could, as we have indicated, make it a choice between opposing the measure or avoiding the Government's resignation, but the capacity to trigger an election is gone. Threatening resignation is a powerful tool, but it is not equal to the threat of a general election. With an election, backbenchers are vulnerable to losing their seats. The resignation of the Government means the Government is out, but backbenchers are not. Dissident backbenchers could be threatened with withdrawal of the party whip, but when the Major Government pursued that route it backfired -the whipless MPs used their status as a badge of honour, and the whip was soon restored (Norton 1998, pp. 86-9) . There is little to match the impact of threatening a general election.
In an era when Government backbenchers are willing to vote against their own side more often than before (Norton 1975 , 1978b , 1980 , 1985 , Cowley 2002 , 2005 , Cowley and Stuart 2014 , the removal of an important power of the Prime Minister to maximise voting support could prove to be crucial in the event of a party split on a major issue.
